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I. INTRODUCTION

Recent incidences of fraud within the mutual fund industry have created
unease with the methods used to police securities by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the Department ofJustice, and the states.
In an almost axiomatic response, Congress rushed to offer legislation
promising to clamp down on unscrupulous fund managers bilking smaller
volume investors out of pensions and savings. The movement towards more
intense securities regulation seems analogous to the prohibition-era
emergence of bootlegger-busting feds, breaking up the speakeasies and
stifling the hooch trade. Ironically, some of the tools previously used to
prosecute organized crime figures may experience resurgence in the field of
high finance.
Current thinking about mutual fund fraud rests on a simple premise:
traders, using gaps in existing rules or openly subverting the law, conspire
with brokers and dealers (and possibly fund managers) to reap illegal profits.
As a result of the practices described below, illicit traders and broker-dealers
achieve high levels of success in the market while ordinary investors are
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burdened with shares of a damaged fund. To be certain, these problems are
not solely theoretical. Misconduct within the system exists, and there have
been documented cases of fraud perpetrated by fund managers, traders and
broker-dealers.' The examples that follow have motivated Congress to
increase pressure on the SEC and the industry to eradicate wrongdoing.2
The legislative proposals listed below expired with the close of the previous
Congressional session; 3 nevertheless, the ideas espoused should not elapse.
Almost certainly, there will be a need for mutual fund reform in the near
future.' Whether promulgated as SEC rule or federal law, the next
incarnation of mutual fund regulation must contain measures addressing late
trading, broker-dealer relations, and should include a shift towards fair value
pricing.
As the SEC promulgates new rules and Congress pontificates on the
need for reform, investors, brokers, and dealers are thinking up new ways to
circumvent the established policies. Thus, it is helpful to examine from
where the controversy erupted, and to where the ultimate goal lies.
Certainly, wherever vast amounts of wealth are concentrated there is
motivation to cheat. The damage levied by fraud in this arena has the
potential to affect many people and their personal finances.'
This article begins with an examination of the current problems in the
regulatory structure of mutual fund oversight by looking at the methods
advanced by unscrupulous investors, brokers, and funds. The three avenues
explored below, late trading, unfair broker-adviser relations, and fair value
pricing, are investors' dubious preferences for fast returns. I explore late
trading first in order to emphasize the brazen attempts by brokers to
circumvent existing law. The methods described give insight not only to the
troublesome transactions, but also give guidance to correct the problem and
prevent future abuses. Then, I will broach the legal, but no less insalubrious
area of dealings between brokers and advisers. By examining the current
scheme, as codified in federal law, I have arrived at the conclusion that these
types of deals must be outlawed in order to protect investors from conflicts
of interest. The final issue that warrants attention is fair value pricing and the
argument for uniform market prices. This controversial proposal is often
I
2

See generally infra notes 23 and 31 and accompanying text.
See generally infra Part V.

3

Id.

A 2004 survey by the Investment Company Institute concluded, following 15 Congressional
hearings in an 8 month period, that "[Riegulatory reform was desirable to help address late trading and
abusive short-term trading...." Investment C. Inst.,Annual Report to Members (2004) at 11-12, available
at http://www.ici.org/pdf/04 ici_annual.pdf.
4

s

Mutual funds are a $7 trillion business. See Peter Elkind, The Secrets ofEddie Stem, FORTUNE,
Apr. 19, 2004 at 106.
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misunderstood. However, I demonstrate that global markets can be manipulated and bastardized, and thus, demand federal oversight.
Next, I will examine some failed attempts to reform the current system
governing trading.6 Although the legislation noted was not enacted, I believe
that the ideas promoted should appear in future proposals. The strengths
and weaknesses of three bills are explained; although these measures never
received a vote, they are significant, primarily, because lawmakers have
identified problem areas and have determined that action is necessary to
resolve conflict.
I conclude with my own proposal to reform the mutual fund industry.
Many of the ideas I have included appear in the three unsuccessful bills.
However, the points that need additional attention are further discussed, and
I arrive at a final suggestion.
7

IX. LATE TRADING

Mutual fund prices are set after the close of the exchange markets (4 p.m.
Eastern) for the next business day's trading.' The net asset value (NAV) of
the fund must be reported shortly thereafter. 9 During the period between
the time that the market closes and the new NAV is reported, a shrewd
investor could buy shares of an undervalued fund, or sell shares of a fund
that will fall when the new numbers are released. The investor does not have
to rely on speculation, as do ordinary traders, because companies often make
important disclosures following the close of the market."0
The SEC has discovered several different methods by which late trades
are conducted." Previously, the SEC permitted trades of mutual fund shares
See generally infa Part V.
In the interest of unqualified clarity, it is necessary to affirm that late trading is currently an
illegal practice. See 17 C.F.R. S 270.22c-1 (2005).
IId. S 270.22c-1(b)(1) (2005).
9
The Wall Street Journal has reported that, according to Nasdaq, in the past year 7.6 percent
6

of mutual funds transmitted daily prices to the Nasdaq mutual-fund quotation service before 5 p.m., 45.8
percent of funds transmitted their daily prices from 5 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. and 40.9 percent did so from 5:30
p.m. to 5:50 p.m. Thomas C. Frongillo, Christine S. Chung, and Najwa M. Nabti, 'LateTrading'ofMutual
Funds: Chinks in the Armor of the Regulators' Claim That it is Illegal Per Se, 10 No. 10 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG.
& REG. REP. 2, (Sept 22, 2004) (quoting Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella, Law Firms Advised on Rules
Governing Funds' Late Trading,WALL ST.J., Dec. 2,2003 at C1).
to
For one example of disclosure guidelines used by a public company, see, Magma Design
Automation Corporate Disclosure Guidelines (January 24, 2006) available at http'/investor.magmada.com/downloads/CorporateDisclosureGuidelines.pdf.
"
Testimony Concerning Recent Commission Activity to Combat Misconduct Relating to Mutual Funds:
Before the S. Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security of the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Stephen M. Cutler, Director,
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to pass through intermediaries, who would consolidate orders placed by all
their clients and forward them in bulk to the fund managers.12 These13
transfers would usually occur following the close of the market.
Intermediaries were required to time and date all trade orders received from
their clients. 14 However, in several cases, traders would make orders to buy
or sell based on speculation, and could have their theories confirmed or
refuted before the trades were complete."5 Note the following example:
Assume Trader X owns a significant number of shares of Generic Mutual
Fund (GMF). GMF holds a high volume of stock in a company, ACME Inc.
Trader X learns at 2 p.m., that ACME Inc. will make an announcement at
4:05 p.m., following the close of the market. Trader X believes that ACME
plans to announce the award of a highly lucrative government contract. The
company releases the information at 4:05 p.m.; if ACME announces the
contract, Trader X (along with all ACME investors) can celebrate, and shares
will appreciate when the new NAV of GMF is determined. However,
suppose ACME drops a bombshell, and announces that they are under
investigation for potential antitrust violations; shares ofACME are certain to
fall when the market resumes trading. Overnight, GMF will price the value
of its fund and shares to reflect this loss of value in ACME.
Now, consider Trader Z, who also owns shares of GMF, and also knows
about the pending ACME announcement. Trader Z likewise believes that
ACME will have good news, but wants to be certain. Trader Z calls his
broker (they are old friends, and Trader Z does a lot of business with the
broker's firm) and places an order to sell all shares of GMF. The broker
takes the order at 2 p.m., but will pool the order with those of all other
traders and report them as a group to GMF later in the day. Now, if ACME
makes the disastrous announcement at 4:05 p.m., Trader Z can breathe a sigh
of relief. His cautious nature has paid off, and his money is safe. On the
other hand, if ACME does indeed announce the award of the government
contract, which all traders believed they would, Trader Z can call his broker
buddy and cancel the sell order of his GMF shares before it has been
reported to the fund. 6 The order had been time stamped for 2 p.m., but will
Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and
http-//www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts 110303smc.htm.
12
17 C.F.R. 270.22c-1 (2005).

Exchange

Commission),

available at

S

13

Id.

14

15 U.S.C. S 78a, et seq., Rule 17a-3.
Seegenerally Linda C. Thomsen, Recent SEC Enforcement Cases,SL047 ALI-ABA 199,Jan. 12-13,

15

2006.

The SEC notes that orders are routinely reported by brokers to fund managers in the middle
of the night. Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 at
70,389 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 270.22c-1).
16
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never be seen by the fund or the SEC, so no record of wrongdoing exists. In
this scenario, the broker has assisted Trader Z in making a contingent trade.
Trader Z will avoid a possibly devastating loss. 17 Trader X, on the other
hand, who has made no after-hours decision, must face not only the loss on
the value of ACME stock reflected in the share price of his GMF fund, but
also must contend with the additional loss of value created by Trader Z and
others of his ilk.' 8
The above example typifies one type of means by which a late trade can
be completed. The use of contingent trades is relatively simple in concept
and execution. Another simple type of late trade relies on falsified orders and
documents. 9 Investors, with the assistance of brokers, merely backdate their
orders to appear as if they had completed the transaction prior to the 4 p.m.
cut-off. In such an instance, Trader Z would submit his order to his broker
following ACME's disclosure. The market has closed, and GMF will have
calculated a NAV for the next day's trading, but the broker will still be
collecting all the orders placed during the day to forward to the fund. The
broker will simply stamp Z's order to an earlier time, and forward it along
with the rest. This ploy, the common late trade, requires a degree of
collusion between an investor, and a fund's intermediary or the fund itself.
A similar type of late trade is much more savvy and unseemly. Investors,
using computer software provided by brokers, submit and process their own
trades after the 4 p.m. deadline. 20 At first glance, it would seem that the
broker is merely a bystander to the fraud perpetrated, however, at least in one
instance, the investor received the software, made trades with the knowledge
of the broker, and made sales involving funds managed by the broker itself.21
Additionally, lest we assume that the funds themselves are victims to these

17

Note that a late trader often doesn't know the adjusted NAV of the fund they act on. The trade

used as an example represents a case where the fund share will almost certainly drop in price; for other
such transactions this may not be true. It is also impossible to determine how much or how little a fund's
price will change as a result of an after-hours announcement.
IS
Elkind, supra note 5, at 110:
[Riapid trading by one very large customer can wreak havoc on the ability of the fund manager
to make money for everyone else. Big sums rushing in and out rob the manager of flexibility
in buying and selling stocks. He has to keep extra cash at the ready to pay the exiting timer,
which dampens performance. Timing also boosts trading expenses and generates capital gains,
which impose costs on the fund's shareholders. According to one academic study, timing costs
long-term mutual fund shareholders as much as $4 billion a year.
Id.
19
2D

21

See Elkind supra note 5.
Id.
See infra note 23.
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schemes, it is important to note that the funds are aware that late trajers are
infiltrating their ranks.'
Canary Capital Partners, LLC, 23 now stands in court records and
boardrooms as the archetype of late trading. Canary, a New Jersey hedge
fund, recently settled a suit with the State of New York for $40 million and
the promise to cooperate with investigators in the ongoing dragnet of illegal
market timing. 24 The sheer magnitude of inside deals that the investigation
exposed continues to rock the financial and political universes.25
When we think about the composition of mutual fund investors on the
whole, the truly disgusting nature of this crime emerges. Mutual funds are
used primarily as a vehicle for long-term investment and growth. 26 Funds
are filled with investments from 401(k) plans, IRAs, higher education
accounts, investments by insurance companies, and the like.27 In general, the
investors relying on the funds for some personal financial security to keep
their accounts intact until such time that they retire, suffer injury, or send a
child off to school.28 In fact, these investors are injured most when insiders
execute late trading schemes. 29 The damage affecting these non-savvy traders
has motivated Congress and the SEC to propose new groups of regulations."
A. CurrentRegulationsEnacted to Combat Late Trading
Following a string of high profile cases resulting in civil actions,3' the
SEC proposed a revision of the regulations regarding forward pricing of

22
"[T]he SEC surveyed the 88 largest fund companies and discovered, stunningly, that half
admitted to allowing market timing-and 25% allowed late trading." Elkind, supra note 5, at 122.
23
State v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, No. 402803/2003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3,2003), available
at http//www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf.
24
See Deborah Brewster, Gary Silverman and David Wells, Spitzer Targets Mutual Funds Illegal
Trading, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 4, 2003, at 29.
25
See Peter Elkind, Spitzer's Crusade, FORTUNE, Nov. 15,2004 at 129.
2
At the end of 2003, $2.7 trillion in retirement assets were invested in mutual funds.
Investment Co. Inst., Mutual Funds and the U.S. Retirement Market in 2003 (June 2004), available at
http'/Avww.ici.org/stats/mf/fm-v13n2.pdf.
27
See, Mutual Funds Hold 21 Percent Share of U.S. Retirement Market Assets, Investment Company
Institute (June 28, 2002), availableat http://ici.org/statements/nri2002/news_02_retiremarket.html.
n
Id.
29
See Elkind supranote 18.
30
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
31
See generally, In the Matter of Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc., S.E.C. Docket 3178 (May 20,2004)
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims/strongcapital.htm; In the Matter of Alliance
Capital Mgmt., L.P., S.E.C. Docket 3401 (Jan. 15, 2004) available at
http//ww.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims/alliance.htm; In the Matter of Putnam Inv. Co. Mgmt., LLC,
S.E.C. Docket 1913 (Nov. 13, 2003) availableat http;//www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims/punam.htm.
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mutual fund shares.32 The new rules seek to halt the methods used by
investors and brokers to make late trades. The most important proposition
would limit the number of entities that can work directly with a fund to
secure an order.33 Under the new rules, only a fund, a designated transfer
agent, or a registered clearing agency can complete a trade after the
established pricing time, and still receive the same day price.34 The SEC
hopes that by limiting trades seeking to get same day prices to a select group
3a
of intermediaries, they will be better able to monitor instances of deceit.
Ill. RELATIONS BETWEEN FUNDS, BROKERS AND ADVISERS
As a corollary to the scandal erupting as a result of late trading, relations
between funds and advisers have been heavily scrutinized as of late. Not
surprisingly, regulators have come to believe that standards are too lax
regarding the comity existing between managers, brokers, and investors.36
These problematic relations have infiltrated mutual funds. To combat these
problems, new regulations will most likely seek to prevent the cozy deals that
border on bribery.37 Currently there are some 8,000 funds competing to
secure investments.3 Fund managers are always looking to fill their coffers
with more capital. In this arena of high competition, federal law permits
circumstances whereby managers can solicit brokers and assist them with
making transactions and placing orders. 39 However, given the improprieties
witnessed in some of the above cases, policymakers now question whether
these rules are too lenient, and whether they allow for a pattern of
wrongdoing.'
Canary Capital Partners would not have been able to reap enormous
profits without the assistance (or collusion) of fund operators such as Banc
One Investment Advisors Corporation.41 Banc One permitted Canary to

Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares; Proposed Rule, 68 Fed. Reg.
70,388 (proposed Dec. 17,2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 270.22c-1).
33
Id.
32

3

Id.

35
36

See supra note 32. At the time of printing, these proposals had not been codified.
See infra Part V.C.

37

Id.

Investment Company Institute, Mutual Fund Statistics (last visited Jan. 21, 2005), available at
http'/Aww.ici.org/stats/mf.
39
15 U.S.C. S 78bb(e) (2002).
40
See infra Part V.
41
See Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, SpitzerAnnounces Market-Timing
Settlement with Banc One Investment Advisers (June 29, 2004), available at
http/www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004jun/jun29d_04.html.
38
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engage in market-timing transactions, an activity that is expressly forbidden
in Banc One's prospectus.42 When mutual fund managers agree to permit
market timing trades involving short-term transactions, they have opted for
greed over maintenance of the fiduciary duty owed to investors. A host of
regulators, including NewYork State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, believe
that this sort of short-run thinking will damn the industry.43
A. Soft DollarArrangements
Few investors realize that their financial or investment adviser is not
required to secure the best price on a mutual fund sale." Federal law permits
an adviser to bargain for a price that includes brokerage and research
services. 45 The increase in price beyond the value of mutual fund shares has
become known as soft dollars.' While an adviser generally has a duty to deal
in good faith with a broker-dealer,47 the range of fees that could be classified
as brokerage or research services is galactic in scope.48 An investor looking
to secure a comfortable retirement would likely not understand the rule
concerning the prices sought by their adviser, and also not know the current
NAV of the fund they purchase. While an adviser is required to disclose
policy and practices regarding commissions,49 the curious investor would fare
Id.
See Elkind supra note 25.
44
Securities Investor Protection Corporation, SIPC/InvestorProtection Trust Survey. 4 Out of5 U.S.
Investors Fail "Survival Skills" Survey Test, Dec. 31, 2005 available at
http:/Avww.sipc.org/media/release13DecO5.cfm. "[T]he vast majority of American investors do not
possess important 'investor survival skills' needed to build their savings into a retirement nest egg..."
42

43

45

15 U.S.C. S 78bb(e)(1) (2002).

See Eric W. Pinciss, Sunlight is Still the Best Disinfectant: Why the Federal Securities Laws Should
Prohibit Soft DollarArrangements in the Mutual Fund Industry, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING& FIN. L. 863,865-66
(2004):
Soft dollars are generally defined as a discretionary arrangement where an investment adviser
46

directs her client's brokerage transactions to a broker-dealer and the adviser receives (in
addition to trade execution) research and other related services from the broker. To calculate
soft dollars, the cost to execute a portfolio trade is subtracted from the brokerage commissions.
Thus, the amount of soft dollar credits that an adviser accumulates with a particular broker is
based on the volume of commissions that an adviser directs to the broker. (Citations omitted).

ld.
47

15 U.S.C. S 78bb(e)(1) (2002).

Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance, and Other Practices that Harm Investors: Before the S.
Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security of the S. Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of U.S. Senator Daniel K Akaka), available at
http://akaka.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Home&month= l&year=2004&r
eleaseid=278.
49
15 U.S.C. S 78bb(e)(2) (2002).
48
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well to examine the fine print of any contract; there is no requirement that
the disclosure be plainly stated " Codification of soft dollar arrangements
gives credence to the practice, and as such, an adviser would not be violating
the fiduciary duty to an investor by striking a deal with a broker-dealer."'
Investors, howling about the seedy nature of these relationships, are in good
company; many lawmakers have also expressed severe displeasure with the
rules governing soft dollar arrangements.5 2

IV. FAIRVALUE PRICING
Possibly the most controversial and misunderstood facet of mutual funds
involves proposals espousing the use of fair value pricing. Quite simply, if
we return to the hypothetical trade discussed above, we can imagine a more
legitimate scenario by which the nefarious Trader Z can profit from
information gained from a corporate disclosure following the close of
trading. Instead of investing in ACME Inc., imagine GMF holds large
amounts of stock in Sony. Now, when the Tokyo exchange closes and Sony
announces record sales of the newest gadget, Trader Z will just be sitting
down to his morning coffee (assuming the trader is an early riser).
Currently, the net asset value of GMF will not reflect the change in the value
of Sony stock, having been determined as of 4 p.m. the previous day. Trader
Z can load up on shares of GMF, and then dump them the following day
when GMF has had a chance to calculate its true value. While Trader Z has
done nothing illegal, the same problems result from this trade as had from
the ACME deal; long term investors suffer when Trader Z sells offhis shares
of the greatly appreciated GMF.
In the long run, mutual fund investors can only benefit from global
trading. Dealing on the London, Frankfurt, and Tokyo markets allows
managers to protect assets from problems in the American economy.' If we
are to accept global trading as a fact and benefit, some argue that we need to
institute a policy that prevents the type of dealing we consider illicit within
the national field. 54 This concern prompted the push for fair value pricing.
The SEC's current fair value pricing rule allows mutual fund managers
to adjust the value of a foreign security held in a fund's portfolio if the
security is affected by a significant event.5"

However, as the industry

so

Id.

s1

15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(a)(1) (2002).
See infra Part V.
Jon Birger, Don't Get Crushed by the Falling Buck, MONEY, Feb. 1,2005, at 53.
See infa Part V.

52
53
54

s5

See Lewis Braham, "Fair Value" Pricing Isn't All That Fair, Bus. WK., April 28, 2003, at 110.
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currently functions, there is no rule or uniform agreement when a significant
event has occurred that warrants an adjustment, or what mathematical
formula to use to revalue the security." As a result, it is possible that some
fund managers, reacting to an event, will raise the price of a security in their
portfolio, others will lower the price of the same security, and still others will
not act at all. This activity not only confuses and frustrates investors, but it
also injects unnecessary volatility into an already skittish industry. Recently,
the SEC ordered that funds disclose to investors when the fund will use a fair
value price and what effect this adjustment will have on the value of the
fund. 7 However, this ruling does nothing to dispel the wide variation in
valuation models that funds apply. Fair value pricing, like many other issues
plaguing the mutual fund trade, has drawn a response from the SEC, but like
many of the rules instituted recently, the disclosure provisions advocated
merely confuse the issue for investors.
V. CONGRESSIONALLY PROPOSED REMEDIES5 8

The close of the 108th Congress signaled the death of several proposals
to reform mutual fund regulation. 9 However, it would not be unreasonable
to surmise that the ideas found in those measures will return. Like Lazarus,
mutual fund reform simply awaits the benediction of a motivated legislator.
While future incarnations may vary, it is almost a certainty that the provisions
outlined below will again receive a Congressional audience.
A. S. 1958-Application of RICO to Late Trades6°
Introduced November 25, 2003, the Mutual Fund Investor Protection
Act of 2003 exuded enough chutzpah to justify its haughty title. The bill,
authored by Senators Kerry and Kennedy, is the only piece of legislation in
this field that advocates criminal sanctions for trading abuses.6 The bill
56

Id.

57

17 CFR SS 239.15A, 274.11A (2005).

58 The following bills from the 108th Congress contain many of the same terms; in the interest
of brevity, the unique portions of each measure are explored.
s9
The bills listed in this section were all referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, and they did not receive a vote before the 108th Congress ended. The Library of
Congress, Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited June 8,2006).
60
18 U.S.C. S 1961, et seq.
61
See S. 1958, 108th Cong. 11A (2003) (hereinafter S. 1958), which would have added:
[A]ny act that violates section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, with respect to the sale of or
an offer to sell securities of a registered open-end company... section 10(b) or 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with respect to the purchase or sale of the securities of such
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sought to expand the reach of RICO by widening the definition of
"racketeering" contained in the statute.62 The bill would also have increased
penalties for late trading abuses to a potential $10,000,000 fine and 25 years
in prison for a person convicted of a purchase or sale of mutual fund shares
involving illegal market timing.63 The penalty leaps to a $50,000,000 fine for
companies involved in illicit purchases or sales. 64 These increases truly
reflect the authors' frustration with late-trading practices, particularly
considering that the practice was already illegal at the time of the legislation's
drafting.6' But, as has been repeatedly shown, the traditional civil remedies
imposed by the SEC have done little to curb abuses;' at least these
influential lawmakers believe that the Department of Justice needs to be
involved.
In addition to increased civil and criminal penalties, the bill contained
several regulatory provisions.67 The legislation would have required a mutual
fund's prospectus to announce the fund's policy with regard to market
timing trades and to state what measures the fund managers would employ
to prevent such abuses.' While this effort seems hollow given the incident
involving Banc One,69 the potential for a private action is greatly enhanced,
and investors could more easily demonstrate violations of fiduciary duties,
should their fund act contrary to its filed statements.
Along those lines, the Kerry - Kennedy bill would have required the SEC
to promulgate rules regarding a fund's duty to show that fees paid by the
fund are in the best interests of shareholders. 70 This, and other goals of S.
1958, represent an effort to force sunshine into the inner workings of the
funds. It is not surprising that Congress seeks to allow for disclosure
regarding transactions unrelated to direct purchases and sales. 7' However, it

a registered open-end company, or (I) section 22(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
with respect to the valuation of the securities of such a registered open-end company; to the
definition of racketeering that appears in the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1961.
Id.

62

18 U.S.C. S 1961, et seq.
S. 1958, S 101(b)(2)(B) (2003).

64

Id.

65
67

See 17 CFR S 270.22c-1.
See supra parts II and III.
See S. 1958, S 101(d) (2003).

68

Id.

69

See supra note 41.

70
71

See S. 1958, S 101(g) (2003).
Mark J. Astarita, Introduction

66

to

the

Securities

Laws,

SECLAWS.COM,

http'//www.seclaw.com/seclaw.htm:
Leaving the specifics of the regulations to later chapters, it is sufficient to note that the vast
majority of securities regulations are aimed at one goal-to promote fair and full disclosure of

2005,
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is surprising that the industry has not been more receptive to these ideas
without interference from federal lawmakers. Given the size and scope of
the industry, 72 it is a wonder that larger funds are not making sufficient
efforts to reform practices in an effort to woo investors who are tired of
reading about scandals.
B. S. 1971--CorporateGovernanceReforms for Mutual Funds
Senators Corzine and Dodd obviously kept Enron in mind when they
submitted S. 1971, The Mutual Fund Investor Confidence Restoration Act
of 2003.' 3 The second of the failed mutual fund reform bills emphasized
disclosure and oversight.74 The legislation would have required revelation
of the actual expenses (for maintenance of the fund) allocated to each
shareholder.7
Also, the fund would have been required to disclose how the fund
managers were to be compensated, as well as the ownership interest of the
managers. 76 Along with a host of other information required, the bill
mandated the release of details concerning soft-dollar arrangements.'
Similarly, it required disclosure by investment advisers of soft-dollar fees
received from funds or brokers. 8 Unfortunately, this bill contained
disclosure exceptions for research and brokerage fees, as defined in the SEC
regulations.7 9 This omission facilitates the same type of abuses that currently
occur, whereby investors are blind to relations existing between their advisers
and the funds they purchase into (or the intermediary promoting the
purchase). The legislation required publication of a wealth of other
information that would have shed light into the complicated dealings of
advisers, brokers and funds.'

all material information relating to the markets, and to specific securities transactions,
including all aspects of market trading, as well as the financing and financial reporting by
public companies.
Id.
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See Elkind supra note 5.
S. 1971, 108th Cong. (2003) (hereinafier,S. 1971).
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See, S. 1971 S 101(a)(1)(A) (2003).
See id. S 101(a)(1)(B).
Seeid. S 101(a)(1)(E).
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See id. See also supra note 45.
See S. 1971 SS 101-104 (2003).
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Interestingly, the bill called for the creation of a mutual fund code of
ethics and its release to investors.8 ' Advisers, brokers and funds would have
been required to note waivers and violations of the code provisions, but the
legislation did not provide for forfeiture of license as a remedial measure.82
The introduction of ethical considerations is an important step toward
mutual fund reform. These rules would seem obvious to an entity entrusted
with fiduciary duties, but given the current status of SEC regulations, too
many decisions concerning revelation are left to the discretion of the
individual advisers, brokers and fund managers.'
S. 1971 contains a provision that required the SEC to create rules
regarding the use of fair value pricing." The rules would have explained
when and how fair value pricing was to be used.' Individual funds would
be required to disclose internal policies to shareholders, and certify
compliance with the policy.8s
Finally, the legislation contained an important provision aimed to assist
investors in understanding the information released by their advisers. 7 The
language of the bill itself is rather benign, requiring only a study to determine
what investors know, what they should know, and how they could become
better informed.8 8 However, the provision is significant for its admission
that investors do not have all the facts. As has been repeatedly shown in
other areas,' 2 the optimal method of ensuring professionalism within the
mutual fund industry is a vigilant and knowledgeable public that will move
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See id. § 301(a).

8

Id.
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149 CONG. REC. S16015-17 (daily ed. Nov. 25,2003) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
See S. 1971 S 304(a) (2003).

84
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Id.
Id.
S. 1971

§ 501(a) (2003) states:
IN GENERAL-The Securities and Exchange Commission shall conduct a study to
identify(1) the existing level of financial literacy among investors that purchase shares of open-end

97

companies ... ;

(2) the most useful and understandable relevant information that investors need to make
sound financial decisions prior to purchasing such shares;
(3) methods to increase the transparency of expenses and potential conflicts of interest in
transactions involving the shares of open-end companies;
(4) the existing private and public efforts to educate investors; and
(5) a strategy to increase the financial literacy of investors that results in a positive change in
investor behavior.
Id.
89

S 5. 1971 S 501(a)(1-5) (2003).
See e.g. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552 (2002).

326 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:313
their investment dollars away from funds and advisors who abuse their
fiduciary duties. The bill recognizes that the informed investor is
empowered; if investors demonstrated strong fiscal acuity, perhaps the
current SEC regulations would be sufficient to guarantee compliance.
However, this legislation made an important admission: sometimes the
government must force sunshine where private industry is reluctant to
permit. 9°
C. S. 2059-A Comprehensive Overhaul ofthe Industry
Of the three Senate bills profiled here, the Mutual Fund Reform Act of
200491 contained the most aggressive and sweeping regulatory changes.
Introduced by Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald, the bill included many disclosure
requirements found in the other legislation, as well as requirements that the
information released to investors be standardized throughout the industry.9 2
Like the Corzine-Dodd bill, 93 the information must contain details about
fees charged to investors,94 as well as information about the compensation of
fund managers. 9 In addition, the bill would have required the SEC to
approve any changes to a fee schedule before the amounts were passed on to
shareholders.'
Importantly, this bill included a distinct provision that would have barred
soft-dollar arrangements between parties to a transaction. 97 The Fitzgerald
bill recognized the deficiency of the Corzine-Dodd bill, and admitted that
no sort of kickback relationship could co-exist with a viable fiduciary duty to
investors. 98 Rather than adjust the rules regarding soft-dollar relations and
wait for another loophole to be exploited, the drafters of the bill took the
more proactive step of an outright ban on the arrangement.' Surely, this
measure would ultimately force advisers and brokers to adjust their practices
and find new sources of research, possibly by raising fees. But, perhaps an
increase in fees (which would be fully explained in accordance with the
disclosure rules) is a necessary remedy for disreputable relations between
brokers and funds. In any event, permitting the appearance of conflicts of
90
91
92
93
9
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interest is the worst possible menace to the mutual fund industry if
continued growth and confidence are to be the goal.
This legislation would also have directed the SEC to develop a policy
concerning fair market value."'0 The SEC would have the authority to select
the method whereby fair value price was calculated, and require its adoption
by all funds. Given the controversy surrounding the practice, it would
appear that the philosophy underlying this provision is that it is preferable to
be wrong than it is to be different, thus, erroneous pricing is negated if all
funds are mistaken together.
The bill contained a provision that parallels the Corzine - Dodd language
concerning investor education.'0 ' However, the Fitzgerald provision is even
more watered-down. 1 2 S. 2059 would require the SEC to study the
feasibility of a requirement that funds post filings on the internet, and the
SEC would, likewise, post the relevant laws and announcements.0 3
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES
While there are many problems afflicting funds, the three presented
above, namely late trading, manger relations and fair value pricing, can be
quickly and efficiently dealt with. Foremost, Congress needs to step forward
and again clarify that late trading is patently illegal. As suggested in S.
1958,' RICO should be amended to allow for imprisonment of abusive
managers and broker-dealers. The threat of civil penalties cannot possibly
dissuade an avaricious investor when trillions of dollars are at stake. With the
type of white-collar crimes involved, criminal sanctions can be an effective
preemptive measure.105 Late trading is motivated by greed, not any sort of
100

S. 2059 S 313 (2004) reads:
(a) IN GENERAL-Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall prescribe ... standards concerning the obligation of registered investment
companies... to apply and use fair value methods of determination of net asset value ... in
order to prevent dilution of the interests of long-term shareholders or as necessary in the
public interest or for the protection of shareholders.
(b) CONTENT-The rule or regulation prescribed under subsection (a) shall identify, in
addition to significant events, the conditions or circumstances from which such an obligation
will arise, such as the need to value securities traded on foreign exchanges, and the methods
by which fair value methods shall be applied in such events, conditions, and circumstances.
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necessity; as such, a mutual fund investor, engaged in an illegal trade, can be
distinguished from other types of criminals. 0 6 Careful planning must be
undertaken and alliances must be forged to complete an illicit deal. At every
step along this iniquitous path, the parties involved should be wary that their
liberty is at stake, and the prospect of greater wealth may consume an even
greater fee. No penalty, even revocation of trading licenses, matches the
weight of criminal liability, and no broker or manager can dismiss such a
possibility if the threat of action is real and ubiquitous.
Next, the mutual fund industry must recognize the obligation they owe
to investors, and must comprehend who their investors are. Funds and
broker-dealers that brush aside long-term investors in favor of big money
clients erode the integrity of the institution and threaten the future of
millions of Americans.
It seems palpable that part of the fiduciary duty owed to investors ought
to include a plain-language assessment of the fund's policies, procedures,
fees, and duties. In addition, the pragmatic fund or broker should cater to
the sensibility of investors and opt to provide a clear outline of practices in
an effort to garner more business; however, this is not the case. Without an
effective regulatory mandate, funds and brokers will not provide a complete
and accurate prospectus. At the very least, this information should contain
complete detail of fee arrangements including, what fees exist and the
amount of charges levied. Also, any disclosure should announce the interests
that managers hold in funds. The public should be aware if a fund's
managers own (or even more frightening, don't own) shares of a fund.
As is noted in the Congressional proposals above, 10 7 the information
released to the public needs to be presented in a way that the average investor
can read and absorb; releases, disclosure and accurate reporting can only
assist the public if they can understand the materials they have been
presented. If an investor makes a decision on a broker or fund based on this
disclosed information, a cause of action may later arise if the facilitator has
not complied with the information furnished.' This represents an effort to
empower the investing public to take an active role in oversight of the mutual
fund industry.
from the Enron scandal):
Men like Ebbers (or Ken Lay or Jeff Skilling, who have yet to face trial in the Enron debacle)
weigh their options--objectively assessing risk and reward. This may make them canny crooks,
but it also makes them supremely responsive to the deterrent factors that most legal
economists wrongly imagine apply to everyone--chief among them is fear.
Id.
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Like the Fitzgerald bill,"° a rule barring soft-money arrangements should
be adopted. No adviser or broker should receive any credit for steering
customers to specific funds or houses. Even if the end result is higher fees
charged to negate the cost of research services, the industry must not appear
any less than absolutely forthright and independent about the responsibility
to investors to secure the lowest possible price of fund shares.
An effective mutual fund industry needs to make a decision regarding fair
value pricing and adhere to its rule. Indeed, this is literally a problem of
global proportions, and any option will be criticized greatly; however, the
current state of confusion allows some funds to apply the rules, others not
to, and everyone to end up with a different price.110 Because of the very
nature of the problem (i.e. pricing of foreign securities), perhaps a successful
solution will involve negotiations with figures from the Tokyo, London, and
Frankfurt exchanges. 1 ' In any event, once chosen, the rule should be applied
to all funds, and preferably in foreign exchanges as well.
Congress would be well served to adopt the changes outlined above.
The public needs these reforms, precisely because the average investor does
not generally understand the problems involved.
VII. UTOPIAN MUTUAL FUNDS

Clearly, the mutual fund industry exists in a state of chaos. Even if one
were to disagree that the problems presented here actually harm investors, it
is indisputable that the uncertainty surrounding proposals for regulations,
indictments, and Congressional inquiries create havoc on the trading floor.
Even if the SEC and Congress were to enact an entirely new set of rules, the
industry would be able to cope, adjust, and thrive. However, as the situation
now stands, today's standard could become tomorrow's crime. All the while,
the casualties of these practices constitute the most sympathetic of all victims,
namely pension funds, families, and retirees.
Taking the most cynical view, this arena provides an excellent
opportunity for a legislator to win priceless political capital. A strong willed
legislator seeking to become a populist champion would attain legendary
status with the public by directing a war against the manipulative investment
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houses and defending the common interest.1 2 Given that the scope of
mutual fund investment is expanding and will likely experience continued
growth, millions ofAmericans seek to have their futures protected against the
ominous specter of Wall Street greed. Congress should act on the situation
and should move ahead, independent of the SEC's somnolent review
process.
VIII. CONCLUSION: LOOKING TowARDs THE FUTURE
The best interests of the economy are served by a viable mutual fund
industry. Like so many other arenas, the industry has become corrupted by
traders seeking quick returns that have diluted portfolios and injected
uncertainty into the trade. Nevertheless, it is promising that so many
Americans have entrusted their retirement, future security, and the financial
future of their children to the funds. Acknowledging this trust, Congress
needs to appreciate the duty they owe to protect the assets of ordinary
citizens. Mutual fund reform has failed, but hopefully it is only a temporary
failure. A reinvigorated Congress should realize the gravity of the situation,
and opt to make the small adjustments necessary to shed light on the
practices used. Once the process has been opened to scrutiny by regulators
and investors, the industry will continue evolving. There is no longer a place
for the Canary Capital and Banc Ones of the world to cannibalize other
investors. If given the tools, the industry itself will push these rogues aside
in order to welcome the assets of legitimate patrons.
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